

## Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 STATE 088065

40

ORIGIN PA-04

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 RSC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 ISO-00 EUR-25 NEA-10

/061 R

DRAFTED BY PA/M:PDENNIS:KR

APPROVED BY PA/M:FWISNER

S/S-O: W.NEWLIN

S/S: W.LUERS

----- 115595

O 301751Z APR 74 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL ALEXANDRIA IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 088065

TOSEC 68

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith WASHPOST APRIL 30 EDITORIAL COLUMN BY VICTOR ZORZA, HEADED "KISSINGER'S MIDEAST END-GAME."

2. "IT IS NOT QUITE FAIR TO SAY THAT THE ANSWER HENRY KISSINGER GAVE TO A REPORTER WAS A LIE, BECAUSE SECRETARIES OF STATE DON'T DO THAT SORT OF THING. THE POLITE NAME FOR WHAT THEY DO IS 'NEWS MANAGEMENT.'"

3. JUST BEFORE KISSINGER LEFT FOR HIS PRESENT MIDEAST TRIP, A REPORTER ASKED HIM WHETHER THE KREMLIN WAS CRITICAL OF HIS EFFORTS TO DEVISE A SETTLEMENT, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE ON THE SOVIET-SYRIAN TALKS. 'I DON'T INTERPRET THE ASSAD-BREZHNEV COMMUNIQUE,' KISSINGER REPLIED, 'AS CRITICIZING THE DISENGAGEMENT EFFORT.' IF HE DOESN'T, THEN HE EITHER HAS NOT READ THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSES WHICH HAVE BEEN REACHING HIS DESK,  
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 088065

OR HE DISAGREES WITH THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF ALL HIS

ADVISERS.

4. KISSINGER DOES NOT WANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE PUBLICLY THE SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO TORPEDO HIS MIDEAST PLANS, BECAUSE IF

HE DID, HE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO CRITICIZE THEM PUBLICLY - WHICH WOULD INVITE COUNTER-CRITICISM FROM THEM. HENCE HIS ATTEMPT TO MANAGE THE NEWS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE RUSSIANS APPEAR 'NOT UNHELPFUL,' AS HE PUT IT, IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE DISENGAGEMENT OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES.

5. BUT WHAT THE KREMLIN IS TELLING THE SYRIANS, BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IS THAT THEY SHOULD ACCEPT DISENGAGEMENT ONLY AS PART OF A COMPLETE MIDEAST SETTLEMENT-WHICH IS DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO WHAT KISSINGER IS TRYING TO DO. IT COULD GREATLY DELAY A SETTLEMENT OR EVEN MAKE ONE IMPOSSIBLE. KISSINGER'S OWN FORMULA FOR A STEP-BY-STEP SOLUTION, UNDER WHICH THE SYRIAN AND

ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD DISENGAGE FIRST, IS DESIGNED TO USE THE IMPETUS PRODUCED BY DISENGAGEMENT TO PROMOTE FURTHER, GRADUAL, MOVES TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

6. THIS WORKED SUCCESSFULLY WITH EGYPT-ALSO IN THE FACE OF OPPOSITION BY THE KREMLIN. MOSCOW KNOWS THAT THE ARABS WANT ITS 'FRIENDSHIP' ONLY SO LONG AS THEY NEED ITS SUPPORT AGAINST ISRAEL. MOSCOW RADIO KEEPS REMINDING THEM THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS THEIR TRUE FRIEND AND THE UNITED STATES THEIR PERMANENT ENEMY. ALTHOUGH THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOW FORMALLY REJECTED THIS ARGUMENT, THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT IS FAR MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO IT.

7. DURING THE VISIT PRESIDENT ASSAD OF SYRIA PAID TO MOSCOW RECENTLY, SOVIET PRESIDENT NIKOLAI PODGORNYY TOLD HIM TO BEWARE OF KISSINGER. 'IT IS IMPORTANT,' HE SAID, 'THAT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEE ALL THE HIDDEN INTRIGUES, AND BE ABLE TO GRASP THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FRIENDS AND ENEMIES.' ASSAD GAVE THE KREMLIN THE IMPRESSION UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 088065

THAT HE WELCOMED ITS ADVICE. AT THE SAME TIME, HIS SPECIAL EMISSARY CAME TO WASHINGTON TO GIVE KISSINGER THE IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA WAS WILLING TO MAKE A DEAL WITH HIM RATHER THAN WITH MOSCOW-PROVIDED THAT THE TERMS WERE ACCEPTABLE, OF COURSE.

8. MOSCOW GOT ASSAD TO SUBSCRIBE FORMALLY TO THE VIEW THAT 'ANY DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT MUST BE PART AND PARCEL

OF AN ALL-EMBRACING SETTLEMENT'-THUS MAKING HIM ENDORSE ITS OWN CRITICISM OF THE KISSINGER APPROACH. THIS AND OTHER SIMILARLY CRITICAL NUANCES FIGURE IN THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE WHICH, KISSINGER CLAIMED, WAS NOT A CRITICISM OF HIS DISENGAGEMENT EFFORT.

9. THE GAME IS RISKY FOR ASSAD, BECAUSE THE FACTION-RIDDEN SYRIAN LEADERSHIP INCLUDES HARDLINERS WHO ARE ONLY WAITING FOR HIM TO PUT HIS FOOT WRONG. THEY WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO TRIP HIM UP, WITH MOSCOW'S SUPPORT IF NECESSARY, AND GIVE THE SOVIET UNION THE FOOTHOLD OF WHICH

PRESIDENT SADAT HAS DEPRIVED THEM IN EGYPT. ASSAD'S ENDORSEMENT, IN THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE, OF THE SOVIET LINE ON DISENGAGEMENT COULD HELP THE SYRIAN HARDLINERS TO PROVE THAT HIS DEALINGS WITH KISSINGER ARE A BETRAYAL OF HIS FORMAL COMMITMENT BOTH TO THEM AND TO THE KREMLIN.

10. MOSCOW RADIO IS ALREADY CRITICIZING SADAT FOR DISPENSING WITH THE SOVIET ALLIANCE AND THUS LEAVING EGYPT DEFENSELESS IN THE FACE OF ISRAEL, AND IT IS ENCOURAGING HIS INTERNAL ENEMIES TO ATTACK HIM ON THIS ISSUE. IT NEEDS NO GREAT STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION TO SEE THE KREMLIN DOING THE SAME TO ASSAD, WHO IS MUCH MORE VULNERABLE BECAUSE THE HARDLINE FACTIONS IN SYRIA ARE SO MUCH STRONGER THAN IN EGYPT.

11. THE KREMLIN, TO JUDGE FROM MOSCOW BROADCASTS, IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DESPERATE ABOUT THE THREAT POSED TO ITS POSITION IN THE MIDEAST BY KISSINGER'S PEACE DESIGN. NOW THAT MOSCOW HAS LOST EGYPT, THE RETENTION OF SYRIA IS CRUCIAL TO IT IF THE SOVIET UNION IS TO MAINTAIN A MEDITERRANEAN PRESENCE, WITHOUT WHICH IT COULD HAVE NO UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 088065

REAL MIDEAST POSITION. BUT SYRIA IS ALSO CRUCIAL TO KISSINGER, WHO MUST SHIFT IT AWAY FROM MOSCOW IF HIS PEACE PLAN IS TO WORK. BOTH SIDES KNOW THAT THE END-GAME IS HERE, AND THAT KISSINGER'S CURRENT VISIT TO THE MIDEAST WILL DETERMINE THE RESULT.

12. KISSINGER BELIEVES THAT HE CAN MAKE SYRIA ACCEPT HIS PLAN WITHOUT NECESSARILY ENDANGERING MOSCOW'S POSITION. HE HAS ASSURED THE KREMLIN THAT HE IS NOT WORKING AGAINST IT. BUT THIS IS ALSO WHAT HE TOLD MOSCOW WHEN HE BEGAN WORKING ON EGYPT TO ACCEPT HIS PLAN-AND EGYPT IS NOW SNAPPING ITS MOSCOW LINKS ONE AFTER THE OTHER.

13. EVEN IF THE KREMLIN WANTED TO TRUST KISSINGER, IT

CANNOT AFFORD TO DO SO. THE STAKES ARE TOO HIGH."

(END TEXT) RUSH

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 30 APR 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE088065  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** PDENNIS:KR  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740103-0067  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t1974042/aaaaabao.tel  
**Line Count:** 171  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN PA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** shawdg  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 04 SEP 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <04 SEP 2002 by BryanSD>; APPROVED <02 JAN 2003 by shawdg>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRESS MATERIAL  
**TAGS:** OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)  
**To:** ALEXANDRIA  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005